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Abstract 
 
The recent financial crisis highlighted the relevant role of the systemic effects of banks’ defaults on the stability of the 
whole financial system. In this work we draw an organic picture of the current regulations, moving from the definitions 
of systemic risk to the issues concerning data availability. We show how a more detailed flow of data on traded deals 
might shed light on some systemic risk features taken into account only partially in the past. In particular, we analyse 
how the new regulatory framework allows regulators to describe OTC derivatives markets according to more detailed 
partitions, thus depicting a more realistic picture of the system. Finally, we suggest to study sub-markets illiquidity 
conditions to consider possible spill over effects which might lead to a worsening for the entire system. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The outbreak of financial systems in 2007 underlines the weaknesses of international regulations concerning banking risk 
supervision. In particular, past regulation on capital requirements was focused on a micro-prudential approach in which 
bank was assessed on the basis of its own portfolio and its own risk, while regulatory capital had to be large enough to 
face bank’s risk level. Conversely, the collapse of financial systems stresses the importance of measuring the risk 
contribution of each bank to the financial stability, thus suggesting to replace the classical principle “too big to fail” with 
a “too interconnected to fail” perspective (see for instance Bastos et al., 2009 and Strahan, 2013). 
The banking sector represents a cornerstone in the analysis of systemic risk due to its important role in the propagation 
of shocks to global markets and wider economy. As emphasized by the current crisis, bank failures weaken the financial 
system and spread financial distress. Therefore, institutions whose bankrupt may trigger the default of other banks need 
more rigorous supervision by regulators and should in principle fulfil higher levels of capital requirements. Hence, the 
need to set up an effective regulatory capital also for the systemic risk motivates the new Basel 3 framework to address 
these points (BCBS, 2013). Nevertheless, a huge debate over systemic risk measurement methodologies, capital 
requirements and effectiveness of the rules is taking place in the banking and academic community. 
Although systemic risk has been largely studied in recent times, literature is still trying to propose a widespread 
quantitative definition. In particular, the effective application of any systemic risk indicator requires that its notion should 
be clearly set forth. Therefore, its definition should be widely accepted by the financial community and implemented in 
the effective risk management practices. This leads to a growing literature concerning the identification of the key features 
of financial stability useful to disentangle bank’s systemic risk contribution. 
One of the most promising attempts concerns the exploitation of the network theory approach to construct and analyse 
financial systems. This perspective has been widely adopted in many other fields, such as the web, the social networks, 
the airport design, the traffic flows and so on. Therefore, once the relationships among banks (e.g. inter-banking market, 
OTC derivatives, etc.) are modelled as a network, where banks are the nodes and their bilateral exposures are the oriented 
links, we could exploit network theory tools and indicators in some way in order to estimate and possibly prevent systemic 
risk. In the international debate the word resilience of the banking system had been largely scrutinized. Thus, what 
happens to the remaining institutions of the system when a large bank fails? This question leads naturally to a Loss Given 
Default approach. Hence, the systemic features of a bank are related to the losses that it can cause by some contagion 
mechanism determined by its default. Therefore, by introducing new capital constraints the banking system should be 
more resilient to such a shock, exactly as an hydric network damaged by a hole in its structure. This motivates the 
investigation of which structures are more prone to spread financial distress. Literature usually indicates two potential 
candidates: a network with a small number of large banks with a “hub & spoke” topology or a network with a large 
number of small banks and a more uniform distribution of exposures. 
These issues and many others cannot be managed, or at best may receive a partial answer in the current state of the 
art. In fact, the lack of a complete data set regarding bilateral exposures does not allow an accurate and granular description 
of the network. In particular, at a local level practitioners (banks) can exploit their peer-to-peer links of all available 
bilateral data, while the scientific community can typically use the aggregate global statistics and some partial network 
information in order to investigate the network features and/or behaviours. Hence, the introduction of new regulations, 
such as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Trade Repository implemented by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in Europe and the Dodd-Frank Act in US, could give new relevant insights on 
the financial system structure. 
Despite the hardness of this field, the paper aims to give an up-to-date overview2 of the systemic risk definitions, 
trying to build a bridge among academy, supervisors and practitioners perspectives. The work is structured as follows. 
Section 2 shows how the various types of actors involved in the debate stress different aspects and give greater emphasis 
to some features rather than others. In particular, Section 2 attempts to bring out the common points proposed in literature 
in order to identify a level playing field. Section 3 discusses the impact of new regulations on the structure of the system. 
Basically, due to the lack of data and the difficulty to match information, often related to cross-jurisdiction situations, it 
is quite difficult to measure the amount and type of bilateral exposures, netting agreements, and collateral positions 
between two counterparties. Therefore, regulators are proposing ways to solve the issue of scarce availability of data. In 
particular, this Section presents the pillars that compose the EMIR, providing details on the effective banking sector 
practices. Section 3 addresses systemic risk from several points of view. Firstly, it describes the rules concerning the 
provision of data and the implementation of the trade repositories. Secondly, it underlines how public dissemination of 
transaction derivatives data might contribute to depict a much clearer picture of the financial systems. Finally, it reflects 
upon how the assessment of systemic risk could benefit from more granular data availability provided by the new 
regulatory framework, thus suggesting to investigate the potential relationship between liquidity risk and the emergence 
of systemic criticalities. Section 4 provides conclusions. 
 
2 Looking for the Definition of Systemic Risk and its Sources  
 
In the last fifty years, quantitative approaches applied to banking activity have grown rapidly. The view of different types 
of risk was not so clear at the beginning. It is worthwhile to recall that the financial (or market) risk, with the VaR-quantile 
definition, was the first to get a systematic treatment, while only in the last twenty years the same improvement has been 
observed for credit and operational risk. The need of risk management techniques and risk measures allowed a very 
successful path for both applied and theoretical research. Among others, we recall the developments in the extreme value 
theory (Embrecht et al., 1999) and the theory for coherent risk measures (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002). 
In the previous cases, it was relatively simple to distinguish and hence to define the different risks. Basically, the risk 
was defined as the loss that the bank could face due to some event in a given class of instruments, e.g. financial instruments 
(market risk), loans (credit risk), and banking broad sense processes and systems (operational risk). In particular, the 
analysis of credit risk belongs to a vast strand of literature which includes also the study of counterparty risk. This type 
of risk is defined as the risk that the counterparty to a transaction involving specific financial instruments may not respect 
its payment obligations. Therefore, counterparty risk is a credit risk, since the loss is due to the counterparty’s insolvency. 
However, it presents two specific features: the uncertainty of the value of the exposition, which is related to the market 
behaviour, and the bilateral nature of the risk. From a systemic perspective, the counterparty risk plays an important role 
in the interbank market where bilateral exposures imply a densely interconnected system. These connections represent a 
significant source of systemic risk as they become a channel in the spreading of shocks, thus causing contagion and 
domino effects. 
The systemic risk concept is well known, but its quantitative study started about only a decade ago (De Bandt et al., 
2009). Thus, it is not surprising that only in the forthcoming Basel 3 framework it receives a set of rules as concerns the 
equivalent capital requirement. The application of any systemic risk indicator requires that the notion of systemic risk 
should be clearly set forth. Therefore, the definition of systemic risk should be widely accepted by the financial 
community and implemented in the effective risk management practices. 
                                                          
2 For a deepening on some of these aspects, the interested reader can refer to Bonollo et al. (2014a,b). 
In the Financial Stability Board (FSB) recommendations (FSB, 2010) several points are strongly stated to face the 
systemic risk of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs). The most relevant recommendation is 
related to a higher loss absorbency capacity required to G-SIFIs to avoid the moral hazard (to accept too much risk) 
implicit in the “too big to fail” or “too interconnected to fail” principles. In order to prevent that some banks could 
misbehave since they are unlikely to fail thanks to public support, it is therefore necessary to require them more capital 
useful to absorb potential losses: financial institutions should be subject to requirements commensurate with the risks 
they pose to the financial system. However, no explicit systemic risk definition is provided. Moreover, the introduction 
states the following preliminary remark: 
This report recommends a policy framework for addressing the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) whose disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and 
systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity3. 
 
To get a definition of the systemic risk, we refer to the recent paper on the systemic risk capital requirement by the 
Basel Committee (BCBS, 2013): 
The Committee is of the view that global systemic importance should be measured in terms of the impact that a bank’s 
failure can have on the global financial system and wider economy, rather than the risk that a failure could occur. This 
can be thought of as a global, system-wide, loss-given-default (LGD) concept rather than a probability of default (PD) 
concept. 
 
Obviously, this definition does not allow to perform any calculation of the systemic risk of a bank, but it still provides 
a sharp clear perspective. The rationale of the regulation is that a bank is systemic if its “systemic” LGD is very large, 
hence its default probability must be reduced by a higher loss absorbency capacity. Furthermore, an enforced supervision 
has to be addressed along with resolution programs. To avoid misunderstanding, we also point out that the above 
definition is referred to the single bank, i.e. to its contribution to the risk of the system. This is different from the risk of 
the banking system as a whole, that we call global systemic risk. 
In particular, the concept of resilience of a system is helpful to describe the network of financial institutions analyzing 
what happens to the other participants of the system when a large institution fails. This allows us to distinguish between 
the topological properties of the network computed to describe the systemic risk as a whole and the contribution to 
systemic risk that the single node determines. Hence, from the regulatory point of view, the purposes concern the design 
of a banking system more resilient to shocks and the identification of which nodes have a greater systemic contribution. 
Surprisingly, most of the papers by regulators and policy groups do not define at all the systemic risk, as if it were an 
obvious, trivial concept or an “axiom”. Hence, most of the works investigate the sources of systemic risk, or the tools to 
hedge it: corporate governance, accounting principles, collateral management, capital requirement, and so on. In those 
papers where a systemic risk measure is given, the risk indicator embodies a semantic definition. In particular, after the 
2007-2008 crisis, a first attempt to design a global framework for the systemic risk is discussed in the joint paper by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) (see IMF-BIS-FSB, 2009). In the introduction section, we have the following statement: 
Establishing what constitutes systemic importance has proved difficult, and most G-20 members do not have a 
formal definition. Nonetheless, in practice G-20 members consider an institution, market or instrument as systemic if its 
                                                          
3 Note that we put in bold (not present in the original document) the reference to the “significant disruption”, since it seems to be very broad, almost 
ambiguous, for a practical implementation. 
failure or malfunction causes widespread distress, either as a direct impact or as a trigger for broader contagion. The 
interpretation, however, is nuanced in that some authorities focus on the impact on the financial system, while others 
consider the ultimate impact on the real economy as key. 
 
Despite the first statement (in bold), where the difficulty of a general meaning of systemic risk is pointed out, we note 
that a LGD approach is implicitly given. Furthermore, the contagion effect becomes explicit. Basically, if the bank i 
defaults and the bank j has a positive exposure to the bank i, say Eji, its credit exposure disappears, unless the recovery 
rate Ri. If the magnitude of the loss (1-Ri)Eji is relevant with respect to a given threshold, say the capital level of j, than j 
could itself default. This is what we call a contagion or cascade default. Note that, in the case of a positive exposure (i.e. 
a credit position) of j to i, the default of i implies a capital reduction for j. If the exposure is negative (i.e. a funding 
position) for j, the default of i might still have bad consequences on j due for instance to liquidity effects whenever i is an 
usual funding source for j. Hence, a withdrawal of liquidity by a bank can cause critical and systemic effects on the whole 
available liquidity of the system. 
The European Central Bank perspective is that (systemic risk is) so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a 
financial system to the point where economic growth and welfare suffer materially (ECB, 2010). Similarly, a Bank of 
England paper (Nier et al., 2008) does not provide any strict interpretation of systemic risk. In a broad sense, it claims 
that systemic risk arises when there is the potential for multiple banks to fail and to impose costs on the financial system 
and ultimately on the economy as a whole. 
With regard to the academic literature, as a definition of systemic risk, let us recall the one by Billio et al. (2012), i.e. 
systemic risk is any set of circumstances that threatens the stability of or public confidence in the financial system. Cont 
et al. (2010) underpin the role of systemic risk, defined as macro-level risk which can impair the stability of the entire 
financial system. Bank failures have led in the recent years to a disruption of the financial system and a significant spill 
over of financial distress to the larger economy. Despite definitions provided in the scientific literature tend to be more 
rigorous, they are also too general for a straight application. 
Finally, an interesting approach is offered by the private sector perspective. For instance, the Counterparty Risk 
Management Policy Group (CRMPGIII) comprised of some leading financial institutions (e.g. JPMorgan, Morgan 
Stanley, Citigroup, etc., see CRMPGIII, 2008) does not provide an explicit definition for systemic risk in its 2008 annual 
paper. On the other hand, the paper stresses some points:  
 
 the complexity of  financial markets makes very hard to detect the systemic risk;  
 the credit concentration is the most important source;  
 some high-level precepts could reduce ex-ante the systemic risk (e.g. corporate governance, risk monitoring, risk 
appetite estimation, contagion focus, enhanced oversight).  
 
As for the industrial standpoint, for the purpose of brevity, let us only recall a recent Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) white paper (DTCC, 2013). The emphasis and the main contribution to the debate is in the attempt 
to give an exhaustive taxonomy of the systemic risk sources, namely: cyber security, new regulations, high frequency 
trading, counterparty risk, collateral, market quality, CCPs (central counterparties), business continuity risk. This list is 
very interesting, as it moves from the classical financial networks (OTC, inter-banking) or liquidity flows to some more 
general risk factors and risk drivers. 
For the sake of conciseness, we omit several other definitions and explanations of systemic risk (see for instance Billio 
et al., 2012 and Bisias et al., 2012), and we try to summarize in a more useful way some stylized facts about systemic 
risk, i.e. all the “coordinates” that allow to set up a reliable framework. 
 
 Perimeter: The systemic risk concerns both the whole system in a macro-prudential approach and the single 
bank risk contribution from a capital requirement point of view. As a useful (non mathematical) parallelism, it 
can be conceived in a broad sense as a portfolio of balance sheets where the linkages between them define the 
dependence structure. In other words, exactly as the VaR and the Component VaR in a financial or lending 
portfolio.  
 Definition: From both global and local perspective, systemic risk is close to a LGD definition. To this end, one 
should well define the loss propagation flows, the default mechanism and the indirect effects on liquidity.  
 Tools to manage and mitigate: In an ex-ante step, to reduce the default probability of SIFIs, via a higher loss 
absorbency. Once the default occurs, a safety net with a recovery and resolution program (e.g. the deposit 
guarantee scheme). Finally, a network topology modification to get lower systemic risk figures, e.g. the 
introduction of central counterparties as robust hubs for the OTC derivative markets.  
 Main gaps and needs: High granularity (i.e. the detailed knowledge of any peer to peer deal), high frequency 
data, high quality data are not yet fully available. Furthermore, also the granularity level and the list of the 
multidimensional attributes of nodes and edges are not yet clear. Their comprehension is a requirement for any 
successful implementation of network theory in this field. 
 
3 The New Systemic Risk Regulatory Framework  
 
3.1 The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Trade Repositories  
 
While the Basel 3 regulation for the systemic risk refers to some heuristic indicators4, a more quantitative approach could 
allow to have a deeper control of the financial system dynamics and related risks. For instance, if we refer to the OTC 
market, until now the reporting, e.g. from Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), etc., is restricted to aggregated measures 
provided by national central banks or by some leading reporting dealers. Therefore, due to the lack of data or the difficulty 
to match information, mainly in cross-jurisdiction situations, it is quite hard to estimate the amount and type of actual 
bilateral exposures, netting agreements, and collateral positions between two counterparties. 
This motivates regulators to set mechanisms to overcome the issue of the scarce availability of data. In US, prior to 
the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), financial institutions had less obligations regarding the amount of financial leverage, 
counterparty risk exposures, market share, and other data to be reported to any regulatory agency. Conversely, new rules 
introduce also requirements on OTC exposures and assign to specific agencies the role of collecting and sharing data. 
Similarly, in Europe the creation of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) are also motivated by the need to enforce the availability of data in order to improve the supervision 
and the restraint of the systemic risk. In addition, the European Parliament established the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) with the Regulation No. 648/2012. Differently from the European directives (e.g. Basel 
3, represented by the Capital Requirement Directive IV, CRDIV), a regulation does not require single countries national 
                                                          
4 The proposed methodology is grounded on a measurement system based on five indicators: Cross-jurisdictional activity, Size, Interconnectedness, 
Substitutability/Financial institution infrastructure and Complexity (see BCBS, 2013). 
laws to become effective. Moreover, the EMIR was enriched by the Commission Delegated Regulations from 
No148/2013 to No 153/2013 along with the ESMA Technical standards. Unfortunately, despite the EMIR officially came 
into force as of 2012, August 16, its effective implementation is still a work in progress. 
Basically, the EMIR aims to reduce or to control the counterparty credit risk, the systemic risk and the market abuse. 
In order to reach these purposes, several new rules have been determined and new tools for authorities and regulators 
have been set up. Hereinafter, we give respectively a general overview of the pillars that compose the EMIR and we 
introduce the Trade Repository which represents the challenging tool that should allow all market players to get useful 
data to assess systemic risk. As a by-product of the new regulation, the trade repository should improve the quality of the 
international derivatives statistics5. 
 
The Pillars of the EMIR Architecture. In recent times, every new financial regulation is summarized in some pillars. 
This facilitates a top down overview of the contents of the new regulatory framework and makes possible a comparison 
between regulations in different countries (e.g. Basel vs Dodd-Frank). The EMIR may be synthesized in the following 
pillars: 
 
 Pillar I: Every eligible OTC derivative must be cleared by some Central Counterparty (CCP).  
 Pillar II: Every non-eligible OTC derivative deal must be collateralized by some suited cash or security 
guarantees by means of standard contracts. 
 Pillar III: The required OTC and listed derivatives data must be reported to the Trade Repository (i.e. the 
reporting obligation).  
 
Although the three pillars look very simple, some hundreds of FAQs have arisen (see ESMA, 2013) and several 
releases of QAs and technical standards have been published to clarify its applicability. First of all, which is the exact 
definition of “financial instruments” underlying the EMIR regulation? We do not refer to the exchange style (OTC vs. 
Listed), but to the payoff of the instrument. As a recent example, we recall that the MiFID directive does not include 
simple forex instruments, such as forward contracts. At the current state of the art, it seems that the EMIR perimeter 
considers all interest rates, equity, forex and commodities, while simple forward operations are included only in the case 
of differential settlement. Regarding the scope of the deal, in some cases the EMIR constraints are not applicable. For 
instance, a deal arranged for economic, commercial or business reasons (e.g. a forex forward instrument underwritten to 
hedge an import/export invoice) can be excluded by the various pillars obligations. Besides, the inter-company deals are 
excluded from the regulation. As concerns the eligible definition, the boundary is stated taking into account the complexity 
of the payoff, i.e. the algebra of the maturity terminal payment, and the complexity of the underlying. Although this issue 
has not yet been solved, it is very likely that forward/future style derivatives and fix-float interest rate swaps will be in 
the eligible category. Regarding the market players that must apply the EMIR, specific obligations are prescribed for 
different operators, namely: Financial Institutions (banks, asset managers, funds), Non Financial Corporations Plus 
(NFC+ in the EMIR definition), and the others Non Financial Corporations (NFC)6. The EMIR requires that Pillars I and 
II are mandatory only for financial institutions and NFC+, while Pillar III is compulsory for all the market players. 
Obviously, some retail or private operators do not report their contracts to the trade repository since the financial 
                                                          
5 See for instance: https://rtdata.dtcc.com/gtr/dashboard.do. 
6 The NFC+ are distinguished from the NFC according to a volume threshold; the volume is defined by the gross notional value, and it ranges from 1 
to 3 billions of euros, separately for the different asset classes (equity, interest, Forex, credit, commodities). 
institution, as counterpart in the contract, will submit both the deal data and the mirrored “customer side” data on behalf 
of him or her. 
The Pillar I aims to reduce the credit counterparty risk of OTC derivatives by replacing the classical peer-to-peer 
relationships with the introduction of some robust hubs, such as the CCPs (see Fig. 1), which satisfy very strict 
requirements both in terms of capitalization and organizational constraints. In the EMIR regulation, the CCPs concept is 
broader than those of the traditional clearing houses hosted in the stock exchanges. However, all OTC clearing houses 
that match these requirements can ask for the registration7. 
 
 
Figure 1: From left to right the transition to a network with a CCP as a transaction hub 
 
         . 
Moreover, one can wonder whether the new topology given by a CCP implies or not a decrease of the systemic risk. 
In fact a CCP reduces the default probability of the single exposure but it increases the loss given default effect. What 
happens when a CCP fails? What if one of its major clearing members defaults? Furthermore, if specific derivatives 
classes are cleared by many separate CCPs (see Duffie and Zhu, 2011), which is the impact on netting capacity and 
collateral demands? 
The Pillar II aims to reduce the counterparty risk by collateral risk mitigation. Even though there are no doubts about 
to the effectiveness of the measure, from a business perspective a high collateral level with a frequent margining process 
could cancel the leverage effect. Hence, one of the main incentives to make a new deal might be hampered. 
Finally, the Pillar III is meant to monitor the systemic risk, the market abuse, and to get more reliable derivatives 
statistics. This aspect will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
The Trade Repository (TR). The trade repository aims to disseminate high quality data in order to depict a 
comprehensive picture of the market and to monitor the systemic risk and market abuse phenomena. The EU regulation 
648/2012 states that this information is made available “...to ESMA, the relevant competent authorities, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the relevant central banks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)...”. This 
means that these authorities are able to drill down any deal between counterparty A and counterparty B, exactly as reported 
by both counterparties A and B. Therefore, the Pillar III of the EMIR looks like the Pillar III of the Basel regulation, i.e. 
the Disclosure Pillar. Hence, regulators can access the highest level of granularity related to the exposures and the risks 
of the banks, depending on their mandates, while the other market participants can exploit only aggregated data by means 
of a set of standardized tables that banks are obliged to publish in their own website. 
                                                          
7 Among them, in the IDEM (Italian Derivatives Market) in Milan the clearing house is the Cassa Compensazione Garanzia, while in the Eurexmarket  
in Frankfurt the clearing house is the EC EurexClearing, and so on. 
From a practical point of view, the implementation of the TR is very detailed. First of all, banks and the others subjects 
do not report directly to the ESMA, as they are intermediated by some Trade Repository Services (TRs). In particular, 
the latter must register with the ESMA and the deadline for the activation of the reporting is 2014, February 12. Data are 
composed of two main categories: the specific counterparty data and the common data (e.g. trade date, notional, 
underlying data, collateral, etc.), i.e. a list of (26 + 59) = 85 variables (fields). Furthermore, existing contracts must be 
reported, along with all contracts with trade date after 2012, August 16 (when the EMIR came into force) as a backload 
process. Besides the EMIR regulation, the most important references for the TRs are the Delegated Regulations 148/2013 
and 151/2013. By matching data provided by the two counterparties, the TRs will follow a data quality process to ensure 
the reliability of granular data as a preliminary requirement for the aggregated statistics. 
 
Example 1 Given an equity option, if counterparty A reports a certain value for the trade date and for the notional 
amount, then for the same deal counterparty B should report the same values. If this is not the case, a warning will be 
issued, and the reporting entities could be penalized if they show a critical error rate. 
 
Although the first step seems a trivial one, it is very hard to implement the “same deal” statement. Usually, each bank 
has its own position keeping system, and each deal receives in the system a progressive deal number identifier. In the 
past, no business reason suggested counterparties A and B to adopt the same identifier, as software and technological 
reasons made it very difficult and expensive. 
Due to EMIR, in order to match and compare data before their publication, banks now must adopt several common 
identifiers and taxonomy codes. Among them, the most important are: 
 
 UTI, Unique Trade Identifier (the deal identifier); 
 LEI, Legal Entity Identifier; 
 UPI, Unique Product Identifier. 
 
The UTI allows the TR to match a deal between two counterparties: in principle, a given UTI value reported by A 
(where the counterparty is B) must exist in the data feed provided by B. Once the common UTI is detected, the TR verifies 
the other variables, most of them are not free text or numerical, although have to belong to a given domain. Regarding 
the LEI, there is the issue of managing the different branches of a group (i.e. it should be able to get the parental linkages) 
and of updating the reference data for counterparties in the internal bank database8. Therefore, it is very important to set 
up a cross reference integrity process. Finally, as concerns the UPI, a problem is related to the classification of deals with 
hybrid products, whose prevailing asset class is not always clear. 
 
Example 2 The UPI defines a taxonomy of the derivative payoff. The financial industry has created over past decades 
a huge amount of clauses for the derivatives contracts. Banks have never applied the same classification, due to the 
different practices and position keeping platforms. For instance, does an Asian option written on an equity basket belong 
to the same family of an Asian option written on an equity index? Could an Asian strike option be included in the same 
category of an Asian price option? 
 
                                                          
8 Banks have internal IDs for counterparties and often some external IDs, e.g. Bloomberg ticker, are linked to them. 
The time frame of the report obligation to the TR is daily, i.e. any new deal is reported within one working day. In 
addition, the general 85-dimensions data requirement depends on the asset class of the deal, namely: interest, equity, 
forex, credit, commodity, and exchange traded derivatives (ETDs). To this extent, the inclusion of ETDs is a questionable 
issue. In fact, the ETDs data are already easily available from Stock Exchanges, indeed it is debatable their further 
transmission to the TRs.  
More specifically, the European regulation 151/2013 designs three different levels of granularity: the Transaction 
level, the most detailed one, the Position level, with details by counterparty and product/underlying, and the Aggregate 
level, with details by product/underlying, but no counterparty information. The authorities and regulators can get the first 
two levels depending on their mandate, while the other market players will work only at the aggregate level. 
Several TRs were registered to ESMA9. Consequently, a new layer of data management has to be created. To have an 
exhaustive picture of the derivatives market, one should extract the same data for a given category from all the registered 
TRs. Hence, some software vendors are developing tools and dashboards in order to collect different data sources in a 
homogeneous setting. 
Anyway, in spite of the huge effort that the whole financial and ICT industry is performing to feed data, the TRs will 
undoubtedly give a lot of tractable empirical data along with new ideas and directions useful to define the systemic risk 
field. After a “phase-in period”, we expect that the systemic risk research based on the TRs might slightly change the very 
heuristic approach to the systemic risk concerning the SIFIs Basel 3 regulation. 
 
3.2 An Example on the Trade Repository Provision of Transaction Data  
 
The introduction of TRs allows a wide audience of practitioners to work with more granular data. Typically, the BIS 
statistical reports constitute the reference for highlights of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets10, providing 
comprehensive and internationally consistent information on the size and structure of the largest OTC derivatives markets. 
In particular, since June 1998, semi-annual surveys focus on notional amounts outstanding and gross market values for 
forwards, swaps and options of foreign exchange, interest rate, equity and commodity derivatives, while as of end-
December 2004 the BIS provides also data on credit default swaps for single and multi name instruments. From December 
2011, the number of reporting countries is 1311. Although more information became available after the outbreak of 
financial markets, derivatives statistics arising from official releases underline the difficulty to depict a granular and up-
dated picture of the system. 
Both the EMIR in Europe and the Dodd-Frank Act in US aim to disclose a more detailed description of the derivatives 
markets. Even though only authorities are allowed to exploit the highest level of granularity provided by the TRs 
framework, market players still benefit from this flow of data through TRs services which collect deals from several 
platforms, leading also to the provision of public access to this information. In particular, in Europe the Commission 
Delegated Regulation No 151/2013 states in Art. 1 that TRs shall publish data (on a website or an online portal easily 
accessible by the public and updated at least weakly) showing a breakdown of the aggregate open positions, transaction 
volumes and values per derivatives classes (commodities, credit, FX, equity, interest rate, and other derivatives). In US, 
                                                          
9 Six TRs are currently recognised by ESMA: CME Trade Repository Ltd., DTCC Derivatives Repository Ltd., ICE Trade Vault Europe Ltd., Krajowy 
Depozyt Papierów Wartosciowych S.A., Regis-TR S.A., and UnaVista Ltd. This list might be updated by any future registrations with ESMA. 
10 BIS statistics on derivatives markets are available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. BIS provides also exchanged traded statistics from 
commercial data sources (see for instance: http://www.bis.org/statistics/extderiv.htm). Other sources of a wide range of statistics are ISDA and OCC. 
In particular, for the purposes of this section valuable references are available at http://www.swapsinfo.org/charts/derivatives/price-transaction and 
http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html. 
11 Every three years addition jurisdictions participate in the Triennial Central Bank Survey. The latest survey took place at end-December 2013.  Results 
are available at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13.htm 
the regulator (Part 43 of the CFTC’s regulation) provides a mechanism for public access to real-time price information 
through Swap Data Repositories (SDRs) which are required to publicly disseminate swaps data as soon as technologically 
practicable after receiving the information (i.e. after execution), unless certain time delays12. Such rules cover any swap 
between two parties that determines a corresponding change in their respective market risk positions, as well as any 
amendments, assignment, novation, termination or other “price forming” life cycle event (see e.g. DTCC, 2014). This 
allows ICT industry to develop tools able to describe derivatives markets on a daily basis, thus providing risk dashboards 
for instruments, counterparty or maturity comparisons. In addition, since deals might be reported by means of different 
TRs, this in turns leads to the establishment of data services providers which collect information from many sources. 
Obviously, these tools do not allow to extract which banks are involved in the transactions as well as other confidential 
data since they represent exclusive information for authorities which are not provided for the general public. However, 
with respect to the BIS statistical releases, they introduce interesting improvements from several points of view: more 
frequent data, a more detailed partition of derivative instruments, information on netting agreements and collateral 
management, detailed data on market prices and volumes.  
From a practical perspective, in US both market players and the general public can benefit from the provision of real-
time data, while in Europe only aggregate information is publicly available. Both US and EU regulations require a wide 
set of contractual information by counterparties, but provide different levels of details for public statistics. As concerns 
systemic risk, in both cases authorities can exploit the highest level of granular data for assessing this risk. However, 
since we are interested in showing how the new regulatory framework on trade repositories strengthens the derivatives 
market description, we believe it is more valuable to focus on an example of the US public dissemination of transaction 
data. For the following analysis, we rely on data from the GTRAnalytics tool13 (hereinafter GTRA). In particular, in our 
study we restrict the analysis to the interest rates derivatives market which at the end of June 2014 accounts for 
respectively the 81% and 77% of the global OTC derivatives market in terms of notional amount outstanding and gross 
market value. Finally, since the swaps market was worth $421 trillion compared with $563 of the total notional amount 
outstanding of the interest rate market14, this motivates our choice to study the swaps segments as representative for the 
global OTC derivatives market. 
Official statistics classify the OTC interest rate derivatives market according to reporting counterparties, residual 
maturities and currencies15. The implementation of TRs provides a detailed classification of swaps derivatives based on 
the types of contractual legs and maturities, thus allowing to analyse the swaps sub-markets separately. In particular, for 
each deal (identified by an ID) GTRA informs whether it is a new contract or a change of an existing one. It also specifies 
the asset class of the instrument and reports a set of information regarding contractual terms including: the execution time, 
the effective date and the contract expiry of the deal, the settlement and both the underlying assets currencies, payment 
frequencies, day count convention, and, obviously, the notional and the price. Moreover, GTRA gives useful information 
on clearing agreements and collateral positions which enrich the description of market trends and improve risk assessment. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to outline that we refer to prices and volumes of actual trade deals in the market which 
consequently extend the traditional use of indicative (bid/ask quotes showed by brokers or data providers) and consensus 
                                                          
12 Actually, deals that would be subject to a time delay are block trades and large notional off-facility swaps. 
13 GTRAnalytics is a software developed by the consulting firm IASON ltd. Basically, this tool collects trades’ information from several TRs and for 
many types of contracts, cleans up the database of manifest inconsistencies and errors and aggregates according to asset classes and deal types. This 
allows us to curtail potential biases due to data misreporting and fragmentation which arise from merging datasets of different TRs and among different 
regulations. Corrections on existing deals which amend or modify contractual terms are taken into account. For references see http://www.financial-
machineries.com/gtr-analytics.htm. 
14 Data refer to BIS statistics and to single currency contracts only. For further references, see http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. 
15 Reporting counterparties are: reporting dealers, other financial institutions and non financial customers; residual maturities are: up to 1 year, between 
1 and 5 years, over 5 years; currencies are: US dollar, Euro, Yen, Sterling, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, Swedish krona, other. Moreover, BIS provides 
also Herfindahl indices for all OTC interest rate derivatives contracts. 
(quotes/prices submitted by market contributors) data. 
The following descriptive statistics present a simple example of the information available thanks to the new regulatory 
framework. For simplicity, we run a daily trade analysis only for clusters of derivatives based on Fix-to-Floating swaps16 
from January to November 2014. 
 
Tab 1: Percentage of deals grouped by settlement currency and contract expiry  
(Source: our estimates based on GTRA data) 
 
Tab 2: Monthly notional amounts (in billion of the respective currency) for selected settlement currencies  
(Source: our estimates based on GTRA data) 
 
Tab 3: Percentage of deals grouped by indication of clearing agreements and collateralization based on different contract expiry 
(Source: our estimates based on GTRA data) 
 
 
Contract 
Expiry 
 
Clearing Agreements 
 
Indication of Collateralization 
Cleared Un-Cleared FC OC PC UC Null 
 1y 39% 61% 6% 4% 22% 27% 41% 
2y 63% 37% 4% 4% 15% 21% 55% 
3y 74% 26% 4% 4% 12% 17% 62% 
5y 77% 23% 3% 6% 12% 16% 63% 
7y 76% 24% 4% 5% 11% 15% 65% 
10y 79% 21% 3% 6% 12% 14% 65% 
20y 83% 17% 2% 3% 10% 14% 72% 
30y 92% 8% 1% 8% 9% 13% 70% 
    
In the previous tables, we show how a swaps sub-market can be partitioned according to contractual terms. In addition, 
other classifications could combine these features or focus on the several underlying assets which characterise the swaps 
market. Since official statistics are usually collapsed in few basic classifications, a more detailed representation might 
contribute to detect which parts of the market shows critical patterns. Moreover, since gross market values indicate that 
contracts with positive and negative replacement values with the same counterparty are not netted, then the introduction 
                                                          
16 In order to focus only on the new effective operations, we consider deals for which “Action” is equal to “New” and “Price Forming Continuation 
Data” is “Trade”. For conciseness, we report only deals for which “Contract Start” is equal to “Spot” and we omit similar statistics for other types of 
swaps such as OIS, Basis and Fix-to-Fix instruments (GTRA provides also detailed information on FRAs, CAPs and FLOORs, and SWAPTIONS which 
go beyond our scope here). Finally, in this part we do not make distinctions among the possible underlying assets. 
 
Contract 
Expiry 
 
USD EUR MXN GBP JPY Others 
1y 18% 7% 22% 1% 2% 50% 
2y 37% 8% 16% 3% 2% 35% 
3y 55% 5% 14% 2% 1% 22% 
5y 63% 6% 9% 3% 2% 17% 
7y 61% 6% 16% 2% 6% 9% 
10y 58% 9% 15% 4% 4% 10% 
20y 49% 14% 7% 5% 21% 4% 
30y 78% 13% 0% 6% 1% 1% 
 
Currency 
 
Jan-14 
 
Feb-14 
 
Mar-14 
 
Apr-14 
 
May-14 
 
Jun-14 
 
Jul-14 
 
Ago-14 
 
Sep-14 
 
Oct-14 
 
Nov-14 
 
USD 1397.49 803.98 1486.38 1219.56 1218.38 1103.89 1108.82 1162.88 1714.17 1739.30 1100.16 
 
EUR 346.78 175.21 277.10 143.34 143.39 196.48 116.50 124.59 242.60 189.82 134.09 
 
GBD 69.51 50.32 54.23 33.79 39.48 41.62 36.23 33.91 55.06 49.45 31.90 
of clearing agreement might shed light on the actual exposures. Similarly, the presence of collateral information might 
enforce the overall perception of risk positions, thus providing a more realistic description. Finally, it is worth 
emphasizing that we can further refine the research with respect to daily or intra-daily deals. Therefore, since the recent 
financial crisis underlines the importance of derivatives market as a channel for the spread of trigger effects, these simple 
examples contribute to claim how a more detailed picture might improve on an almost real-time basis the awareness of 
which swaps sub-markets present systemically important patterns, thus facilitating risk assessment. 
In particular, the use of traded prices and volumes allows to measure market liquidity for categories of instruments 
and expiry dates. For instance, although market participants always need some reference fixings for actively traded 
contracts, in some cases they are only based on indicative prices shown on brokers’ pages. Indeed, TRs data might reveal 
that some markets are quite scant and that indicative quotes give a false sense of liquidity. As regards systemic risk, TRs 
might therefore provide information on whether OTC derivatives market are locally (where locally does not refer to 
regional classifications, but to clusters based on type of instrument, maturity, underlying, etc.) illiquid, thus for instance 
pointing to fire sale issues that represent a mechanism through which contagion effects propagate (see e.g. Diamond and 
Rajan, 2011). In the following example, we use basic statistics to show how swaps sub-markets can differ in terms of 
liquidity. We limit the analysis on the set of Fix-to-Floating swaps with underlying asset equal to USD-LIBOR-BBA 
which represents the most significant subset in our dataset. Below, we focus on the most relevant legs frequencies 
partitions17. In particular, for each date we plot both the average price18 and the respective error bar of the traded deals, 
while along the axes we show the rug plots for both the number of deals and prices. Hence, in order to facilitate the 
representation of prices dispersion around the average values, for each date we compute the upper and lower levels of the 
error bar by respectively adding and subtracting the corresponding standard deviation from the mean value. 
 
Figure 2: Daily mean prices and their respective dispersions for Fixed to USD-LIBOR-BBA swaps with different leg frequencies 
 (left plot 3m-3m,right plot 6m-3m) (Source: our estimates based on GTRA data) 
 
 
                                                          
17 Although one could perform the same study using a wide range of contractual terms, we limit our analysis on instruments with “Contract Expiry” 
equal to “10y”. In order to limit potential biases due to outliers, for each instrument we cut off 0.025 of the area in each tail of the reference sample 
distribution.  
18 In a plain vanilla interest rate swap two counterparties, a floating-rate payer and a fixed-rate payer, agree to exchange net payments, computed with 
respect to a notional principal amount, at a series of future points of time. In the examples, we refer as price as the fixed rate at which counterparties 
find fair to exchange net flows.  
Previous examples aim to show swaps sub-markets liquidity differences. Although it represents a simple way to 
investigate prices dispersion, the use of the mean-standard deviation framework still allows market players to disentangle 
which parts of the swaps market show critical patterns. In both cases, prices’ dispersions undergo significant changes 
during the reference sample, with periods of relative concentrated prices alternated by more volatile intervals. In addition, 
the following plot show how their prices’ behaviours can be compared to study swap sub-markets’ peculiarities. Although 
both instruments present a similar trend, the provision of detailed transaction data reveals monthly differences. Therefore, 
by combining the information from prices’ volatility with the amount of traded deals one might investigate market stress 
scenarios for specific swaps sub-markets. This might suggest a relationship between the emergence of illiquidity 
conditions in specific and important markets and the risk of spill over effects which ultimately might lead to a worsening 
for the entire system.  
 
Figure 3:Box plot of monthly mean prices for Fixed to USD-LIBOR-BBA swaps with different leg frequencies (grey = 3m-3m, light grey = 6m-3m) 
(Source: our estimates based on GTRA data) 
 
From a risk management perspective, the provision of detailed data helps banks to perform properly portfolio 
valuation and manage the model risk. In the recent market practice a new acronym was created, i.e. XVA, to indicate all 
the valuation adjustments in the OTC derivatives markets. More explicitly, XVA stands for CVA (credit counterparty 
risk adjustment), DVA (debt valuation adjustment, the same of CVA but with the opposite sign), FVA (the funding-
liquidity valuation adjustment), and KVA when it indicates the CVA Basel III capital requirement. Indeed, a more detailed 
flow of data might support banks to satisfy the upcoming requirements related to the additional valuation adjustment 
(AVA), which introduce a prudential assessment for those positions measured following a fair value approach. Moreover, 
the integration with internal databases allows banks to compute their relative competitive levels for types of instruments, 
facilitating therefore concentration measurement. In particular, the availability of detailed transaction data improves 
historical and market activity analysis useful to assess the parameter risk arising from the revaluation process of the 
derivatives book. Finally, the use of traded data prevents market manipulation phenomena, thus enhancing a realistic 
description of financial systems. Indeed, from our point of view, it seems that this flow of information is of a higher level 
of detail and quality than that of some risk dashboards utilized by supervisors to measure systemic risk on the basis of 
aggregate variables19.  
                                                          
19 See for instance the Composite Indicator of Systemic Risk (CISS) developed by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) which includes 15 raw, 
mainly market-based financial stress measures. 
4    Conclusion  
 
The financial crisis in 2007-2008 highlighted the relevant role of the systemic effects of the single entities’ defaults on 
the stability of the whole financial system. For this reason, the new regulatory framework adopted a methodology in order 
to face this risk, called systemic risk. However, in spite of the large amount of literature on this topic, the approach 
proposed by the scientific community is still heuristically based on some indicators and quite far from being a proper 
quantitative technique.  
In this work, we draw an organic picture of the current regulations, moving from the definitions of systemic risk to 
the issues concerning data availability. In particular, we discuss how the implementation of Trade Repositories improves 
data collection and makes available more granular information useful to measure systemic risk. We are confident that the 
provision of more detailed transaction data will support regulators’ risk assessment and facilitate market players’ 
observance of regulatory requirements. In addition, we believe that a more detailed flow of data on traded deals might 
contribute to enhance some systemic risk features taken into account only partially in the past. Our analysis shows how 
the new regulations allow to describe OTC derivatives markets according to detailed partitions, thus depicting a more 
realistic picture of the system. Therefore, this might motivate the study on whether sub-markets illiquidity conditions 
determine the risk of spill over effects which ultimately might lead to a worsening for the entire system. Consequently, 
since the recent financial crisis generated from the derivatives markets was due to both credit and liquidity drivers, the 
capability to exploit jointly prices’ and volumes’ liquidity effects gives a new powerful tool to analyse the systemic 
features of these markets. 
 
Acknowledgment 
 
Authors wish to thank Iason ltd for having made the dataset available. Special thanks go to A. Castagna for his precious 
collaboration. 
 
 
References 
 
 
Acerbi, C., and Tasche, D., (2002), “On the coherence of expected shortfall”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26 (7), 1487-1503. 
 
Bastos, E., Cont, R., Minca, A., and Moussa, A., (2009), “Too interconnected to fail: measuring systemic risk in financial networks”, Proceedings of 
the Conference on Quantitative Risk Management, Paris VII University.  
 
BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), (2013), “Global systemically important banks: updated assessment methodology and the higher loss 
absorbency requirement”, BCBS paper 255, Bank of International Settlements. 
 
Billio, M., Getmansky, M., Lo, A. W., and Pelizzon, L., (2012), “Econometric measures of connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance 
sectors”, Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 535-559.  
 
Bisias, D., Flood, M., Lo, A.W., and Valavanis, S., (2012), “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics”, Office of Financial Research, Working Paper 0001.  
 
Bonollo M., Crimaldi I., Flori A., Pammolli F., Riccaboni M. (2014a), “Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions: regulations, research, open 
issues, proposals”, EIC working paper series #2/2014, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca. 
 
Bonollo M., Crimaldi I., Flori A., Pammolli F., Riccaboni M. (2014b), “Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions: From a Global to a Local 
Perspective? A Network Theory Approach”, EIC working paper series #9/2014, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca. (Available Italian version, 
forthcoming in Bancaria). 
Cont, R., Moussa, A., and Bastos e Santos, E., (2010), “Network structure and systemic risk in banking systems”, Working Paper available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1733528 
 
CRMPGIII (Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group), (2008), “Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform”, Annual Report.  
 De Bandt, O., Hartmann, P., and Peydro, J.L., (2009), “Systemic risk in banking: An update”, In: Berger, A.N., Molyneux, P., Wilson, J., et al. (Eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Banking, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Diamond, D. W., and Rajan, R. G., (2011), “Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 (2), 
557-591. 
 
DTCC (Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation), (2013), “Beyond the Horizon, A White Paper to the Industry on Systemic Risk”, DTCC white paper. 
 
DTCC (Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation), (2014), “DTCC Data Repository (U.S.) LLC Rulebook”, Rulebook revised as of 10/03/2014.  
 
Duffie, D., and Zhu, H., (2011), “Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?”, The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 1 (1), 74-
95. 
 
ECB (European Central Bank), (2010), “Financial networks and financial stability”, Financial Stability Review. 
 
Embrecht, P., Resnick, I., and Samorodnitsky, G. (2013), “Extreme Values Theory as a Risk Management Tool”, North American Actuarial Journal, 
3(2). 
 
ESMA (European Security Market Authority), (2013), “Questions and Answers on EMIR”, ESMA paper 2013/1080.  
 
European Commission, (2013), “Delegated Regulation on the minimum details of the data to be reported to trade repositories”, Delegated Regulation 
148/2013.  
 
European Commission, (2013), “Delegated Regulation on the data to be published and made available by trade repositories and operational standards 
for aggregating, comparing and accessing the data”, Delegated Regulation 151/2013.  
 
European Union Parliament, (2012), “European Market Infrastructure Regulation”, Regulation 648/2012.  
 
FSB (Financial Stability Board), (2010), “Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions”. Working paper available 
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101111a.pdf?page_moved=1. 
 
IMF (International Monetary Fund), BIS (Bank for International Settlement), and FSB (Financial Stability Board), (2009), “Report to G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Governors. Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations”, 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf. 
 
Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, T., and Alentorn, A., “Network models and financial stability”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 2033-
2060 (2007), and Bank of England Working Paper 346, (2008). 
 
Strahan, P.E., (2013), “Too Big to Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses”, Annual Review of Financial Economics, 5, 43-61. 
 
US 111th Congress, (2010), “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act”, Public Law 111-203. 
 
Sitography 
 
BIS (Bank of International Settlements). OTC derivatives statistics. Available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.  
 
BIS (Bank of International Settlements). Exchanged traded statistics. Available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/extderiv.htm. 
 
BIS (Bank of International Settlements). Triennial Central Bank Survey. Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13.htm. 
 
DTCC (Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation). Trade reporting repository. Available at https://rtdata.dtcc.com/gtr/dashboard.do. 
 
ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board). ESRB risk dashboard. Available at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/rd/html/index.en.html. 
 
GTRAnalytics. Trade repository tool. Available at http://www.financial-machineries.com/gtr-analytics.htm 
 
ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association). Derivatives statistics. Available at http://www.swapsinfo.org/charts/derivatives/price-
transaction. 
 
OCC (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). US derivative statistics. Available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 © IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca 
Piazza San ponziano 6, 5100 Lucca, Italy. www.imtlucca.it 
